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SUMMARY
This study analyses the link between student test scores and the school students
attend, the policies and practices of the schools, students’ family background and
their parents’ involvement in their education using data from the 2009 wave of the
Program for International Student Assessment. We find that (1) a substantial
proportion of the variation of test scores within countries is associated with the
school students attend; (2) a sizeable proportion of the school fixed effects is asso-
ciated with school policies and teaching practices beyond national policies or other
mechanisms that sort students of differing abilities among schools; (3) school fixed
effects are a major pathway for the link between family background and test scores.
The implication is that what schools do is important in the level and dispersion of
test scores, suggesting the value of further analysis of what goes on in schools to
pin down causal links between policies and practices and test score outcomes.
—Richard B. Freeman and Martina Viarengo
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study uses the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment data set (PISA) to assess
the link between student test scores and the school students attend, school policies and
practices, students’ family background and parental involvement in education. PISA
provides data on test scores, schools and family background for hundreds of thousands
of students around the world, which makes it the largest cross-country data set in the
world for analysing the relation between test scores and their potential determinants.
Our focus on schools and school level policies/practices and parental involvement in
education provides a more granular picture of the factors associated with student
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achievement than is found in studies focused on country-level policies such as national
standards and external exit examinations.1
We find that school ‘fixed effects’ are the most important factor associated with stu-
dent test scores within countries and a major mediator of the relation between family
background and scores. To paraphrase the famous campaign slogan of President
Clinton, the data tell us ‘it’s the schools, stupid’.2 We identify school level teaching
practices as reported by students as major correlates of the relation between the
schools students attend and test scores, which makes them a potential target for
policies to improve outcomes.
There are two pathways by which test score outcomes will vary with the school
students attend. The first pathway is through sorting of students of similar ability into
the same schools due to national policies on tracking, admissions policies of schools or
parent/student or teacher behaviour. Sorting creates differences in outcomes among
schools without necessarily affecting the performance of students. The second
pathway is through school level educational policies/practices that affect student
achievement, with ‘good schools’ raising the test scores of students more than ‘poor
schools’.
Differentiating between sorting and educational effects is difficult in international
test data. To get some notion of the effect of tracking, we contrast the magnitude of
school effects in countries that assign students at early ages to schools beyond their
first school to the magnitude of school effects in countries that assign them later. We
find evidence of a sorting effect: school fixed effects are larger in countries that assign
students to schools earlier than in other schools. But we also find that school effects
are large in the countries without such tracking practices, which suggests that the
school effect on test performance goes beyond national sorting policies and involves
some actual difference in educational policies/practices among schools. We identify
some of the relevant policies and practices in the PISA data on the basis of the
responses of principals and students to questions about how the school operated.
In the PISA data set, as in virtually all other test score data, students from more
advantaged backgrounds perform better on tests than other students. We find that
addition of school dummy variables to test score equations substantially reduces the
estimated impact of family background on scores. The effects are large in countries
with tracking policies and in countries without tracking policies, suggesting that
1 Woessmann (2003a) and Schuetz et al. (2008), find that standards and exit exams affect national test
scores. Studies using other data also show that standards and exit examinations are associated with better
student performance (Bishop, 1997, 2006; Woessmann, 2003b for the TIMSS 1995; Woessmann, 2005a;
Jurges et al., 2005; Greene and Winters, 2005). Studies also find that having an effective link between
assessment and curriculum (Bishop, 2006) and keeping high standards (Peterson and Hess, 2006, 2008)
improve outcomes, and that increased school autonomy positively affects student performance when com-
bined with an accountability system and external exams (Woessmann, 2005a). An increasing number of
countries and states in the US require following a specified curriculum and passing an exit examination
for high school graduation (Ou, 2010; Peterson and Hess, 2008).
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/It’s_the_economy,_stupid.
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schools are major pathway by which parental background relates to student test scores
irrespective of the way students are sorted among schools. PISA measures of parental
involvement in student education, by contrast, do not account for much of the family
background effect on test scores.
The body of the paper consists of five sections. Section 2 reviews the education
studies on which our analysis builds. Section 3 describes the PISA data, the equation
we use to relate test scores to school and family background variables, and the way we
draw inferences about school effects from the data.3 Section 4 presents the estimates
of school fixed effects and the impact of school policies and practices on those effects.
Section 5 gives our analysis of the role of schools and specific parenting practices as
mediators for the link between family background and test scores. Section 6 draws
implications for policy.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
This section reviews studies on ‘tracking and other sorting mechanisms’, ‘school
policies and practices’, and ‘family background and parental involvement’ that
provide the background research on which we build our analysis.
2.1. Tracking and other sorting mechanisms
Researchers in education have long recognized the potential importance of tracking,
defined as the explicit streaming of students into different types of schools according
to their academic performance, on educational outcomes and the transmission of
parental socio-economic position to their children (Betts, 2011). Studies of the effects
of sorting on test scores across countries indicate that early tracking increases inequal-
ity in educational outcomes without improving national scores (Hanushek and Woess-
mann, 2006); adds to the impact of family background on educational achievement
(Schuetz et al., 2008; Woessmann et al., 2009) and labour market earnings (Brunello
and Checchi, 2007). But national tracking policies are not the only source of sorting
students among schools. Parents/students can self-sort into particular schools, from
private schools to public schools of differing quality; teachers of different qualities can
be recruited and choose to work in particular schools; and the government or private
groups can allocate other educational resources differentially among schools.
With respect to student self-sorting, Nechyba (2011) summarizes the following
mechanisms: parental background leading to residential segregation, parental choices
of private as opposed to public schools and of schools of different quality in the sectors.
Nechyba notes that ‘while sorting mechanisms may differ across countries, there is
3 Woessmann (2005b) compared the importance of family background of five Asian countries (Hong
Kong, Japan, Singapore, Korea and Thailand) to three Western countries (France, Spain and the US) in
the TIMSS 1995 study.
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little reason to doubt that sorting itself is a critical component of most primary and
secondary school systems’ (p. 1029).
To the extent that residential areas correlate with the quality of schools in the area
in which a family lives, which will depend on family income and the housing market,
this can create substantial sorting (Bjorklund and Salvanes, 2011). Housing markets
also play a similar role in cases where admission does not depend on the residential
area but transportation is costly (Nechyba, 2011). Another family-based mechanism
for sorting is through parental education. More educated parents presumably have
better information on the different quality of schools (Bjorklund and Salvanes, 2011,
p. 215), and will push harder for getting their children into the better schools com-
pared to less educated parents. Sorting related to education may be closely related to
sorting through economic resources but may also be independent of income as sug-
gested by Bjorklund and Salvanes (2011). And the ability or other characteristics of
students will likely play some role in these modes of sorting.
Finally, there is the sorting between public and private schools, which researchers
have explored both with observational and experimental methods (Epple and
Romano, 1998; Angrist et al., 2002; Altonji et al., 2005). This source of sorting may be
related to family background and income, student ability or other characteristics. To
the extent that the private school sector is well funded, it may work as a sorting mech-
anism even for young persons of modest means, by giving scholarships to the more
able, and even for young persons of modest academic ability, by giving scholarships
for athletic or other talent.
Students aside, the decisions of schools to offer teaching jobs to teachers of differing
characteristics and teachers’ acceptance or rejection of job offers can create sorting of
teachers across schools that will impact student performance. Hanushek and Rivkin’s
(2006) review of studies on teacher labour markets acknowledges the importance of
measuring teacher quality and the difficulty related to selection and unobserved char-
acteristics: ‘Credible research into training versus selection issues as related to certi-
fication policies, merit pay, and so forth clearly requires longitudinal observations that
link teachers, programs, and student performance. Until recently, there has been little
possibility of such work’ (p. 1073). A similar problem is found in the estimation of
teachers’ earnings equations (Dolton, 2006). Still, using a data-rich data set on
teachers in New York, Lankford et al. (2002) found that disadvantaged students are
disproportionately in classrooms with less skilled teachers, especially in urban areas.
They relate this to district differences in preferences for teaching qualifications and
hiring efficiency (which will depend on the school budget), on the demand side, and
teacher preferences on the supply side. They note, however, that ‘we know very little
about sorting or the causal relationships that lead to sorting’ in these situations
(Lankford et al., 2002, p. 39).
With respect to the allocation of other resources, schools with high performing
students may obtain more and better resources while gifted students may benefit from
special programmes within a school or admission to schools with special resources –
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for instance, a special maths or science academy or school for music and performing
arts. But the allocation of resources may be of a compensatory nature (e.g. Holmlund
et al., 2010; West and Woessmann, 2006), In this case, more resources are allocated to
more disadvantaged and low-performing students.
2.2. School policies and practices
The educational literature on the relation of school policies and practices to student
performance provides a benchmark for our findings.
Studies of school selectivity invariably find that more selective schools have higher
performing students than less selective schools and lower variation in scores among
students (Sprietsma, 2008; Jackson, 2010; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013). Studies
of whether sorting students by classrooms within the same school benefits students by
providing more targeted instruction by ability or harms students by reducing the inter-
action between low performing and high-performing students give inconclusive results
(Betts and Shkolnik, 2000; Figlio and Page, 2002).
Studies of School Autonomy and Accountability4 suggest that the alignment of autonomy
and accountability leads to higher outcomes (Fuchs and Woessmann, 2007, Woess-
mann et al., 2009) but have an unclear impact on inequality of outcomes among stu-
dents (Hanushek and Raymond, 2003). Hanushek et al. (2013) shows that for 42
countries that participated in PISA from 2000 to 2009, school autonomy in academic
content, hiring and salaries is associated with higher student learning outcomes in
developed countries.
Studies of Resource inputs such as spending per student, teacher-student ratio, class
size and instructional time have produced controversy. Reviewing extant studies
through the early 2000s, Hanushek (2006) concludes that in advanced countries there
is no compelling evidence that changes in the level of any of these resources, within
the observable range of variation, have a substantive effect on educational outcomes.
The Tennessee STAR study, however, gives a different picture – with a one-third
reduction in class size associated with higher student achievement by the equivalent of
three additional months of schooling (Krueger, 1999). But other experiments find
smaller or no impacts of class size (Chingos and Whitehurst, 2011; Altinok and King-
don, 2012; Woessmann, 2010). Studies relating to teachers’ characteristics such as
experience, academic and professional qualifications, find that while teachers matter
in the sense that individual teacher fixed effects are important in explaining student
test scores, observed characteristics are generally unrelated to teachers’ performance
(Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006).
4 Research in this area using the international studies has examined various dimensions of school auto-
nomy (e.g., autonomy over resources allocation, hiring and firing decisions), regulations of school gov-
ernance and standardized exams (e.g., periodic measurement of teacher and principal performance,
standardized exams).
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With respect to school Practices, Bratti et al. (2011) find that cooperative behaviour
among students through group learning improves educational outcomes. By relying
on a quasi-experimental approach for students in primary and middle schools in
Israel, Lavy (2011) finds a positive impact on learning outcomes associated with teach-
ing practices which include group learning activities and activities that focus on devel-
oping students’ analytical and critical skills. Examining learning practices in several
waves of TIMSS, and PIRLS, Algan et al. (2013) find that ‘horizontal teaching prac-
tices’ (i.e., where students work in groups, ask questions) is related to pro-social beliefs
while ‘vertical teaching practices’ have the opposite effect. Comparing student reports
of teaching practices Bietenbeck (2011) reports that memorization and lecture-style
teaching produce better outcomes whereas selected teaching practices such as working
in groups, students’ autonomy in problem-solving decisions have a small insignificant
effect on learning outcomes. Schwerdt and Wuppermann (2011) compare lecture-style
teaching to problem solving and find a positive association between the practice of lec-
ture-style teaching and students’ test scores.
2.3. Family background and parental involvement
Studies of the educational achievement of young persons invariably find that children
from more advantaged backgrounds perform better on average in school in terms of
test scores and other school outcomes, albeit with heterogeneity in the magnitude of
the impact of background factors among countries (Freeman et al., 2011; Hanushek
and Woessmann, 2011a) and with differences related to the measure of background.
Ammermuller et al. (2005) and Woessmann (2005b, 2008) use parental education to
analyse background effects on children’s education. Other researchers favour the
books at home measure as reflecting not only the parents’ scholarly culture but also
the socio-economic background of the household (Di Maggio, 1982; Dronkers, 1992).
Ammermueller et al. (2005), Woessmann (2003a, 2005b, 2008) and Schuetz et al.
(2008) use books at home in analyses of educational outcomes in different waves of
TIMSS while Peterson and Woessmann (2007) analyse it in the PISA 2003. Other
scholars have relied on the socio-economic and cultural status index. Jenkins et al.
(2008) and Machin and McNally (2012) among others report significant relation
between this index and learning outcomes.
Research on parental participation in home and school-related activities finds a
positive association between parental involvement and students’ learning outcomes
(Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Hoover-Dempsey and Sandler, 1997). But Desfor-
ges and Abouchaar’s (2003) note the limitation of evaluations which do not satisfact-
orily address the endogeneity of parental involvement. Parents with greater education
and resources are likely to invest more time and resources in their children’s education
than less educated parents or those with fewer resources. Parents are also more likely
to invest in the education of children who are more receptive and/or in children hav-
ing problems in school – for instance, meeting with teachers or providing help with
402 RICHARD B. FREEMAN ANDMARTINA VIARENGO
homework. Country-specific longitudinal studies (e.g., the UK National Child Devel-
opment Study, the British Cohort Study, US National Educational Longitudinal
Study) suggest that parental participation in learning activities at home (Schoon and
Parsons, 2002), aspirations for children’s continuing in education (Singh et al., 1995),
discussion of school experience and involvement in cultural and learning activities
(George and Kaplan, 1998) are positively associated with children’s educational
performance conditional on the socio-economic status of parents.
3. PISA DATASET AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1. Data
Beginning in 2000 the PISA study has tested 15-year-old students on their skills,
knowledge and ability to use this knowledge to solve problems in real-life situations
every three years.5 The tests cover mathematics, science and reading. Participating
countries randomly select schools to administer the test and randomly select students
within the schools to provide a nationally representative sample of students. PISA
standardizes test scores to a mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100 on the basis of
the 2003 PISA. Differences in test scores can thus be interpreted in terms of percent-
age points of an international standard deviation. An increasing number of countries
have participated in each succeeding wave, including developing countries outside the
OECD.
We use data on students and schools from the 2009 wave. This data set provides
information on about 520,000 students in 18,641 schools from 74 economies,6 of
whom 34 are OECD countries and 31 are ‘partner countries’ outside the OECD. In
addition to the PISA tests, students fill in a questionnaire on their characteristics, fam-
ily structure and background; while principals of each participating school report on
school characteristics, policies and practices. In addition, 14 countries administered a
questionnaire to parents regarding their involvement at home with the child and in
5 Students’ age varies between 15 years 3 months and 16 years 2 months and to be eligible to participate
must have completed at least six years of formal schooling (OECD, 2010a).
6 Around 470,000 students in 65 countries participated in PISA 2009. In addition to this, about 50,000
students were tested in 2010 in the framework of PISA 2009+ (from 7 countries and 2 Indian states (Hima-
chal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu). This was the same assessment as PISA 2009 but carried out one year later.
More information on PISA 2009 and PISA 2009+ is available at http://mypisa.acer.edu.au/. This is the
list of countries and economies: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Es-
tonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Himal Pradesh – India, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lat-
via, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao-China, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mir-
anda-Venezuela, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Shanghai-China, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tamil Nadu – India, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uruguay.
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school-related activities,7 including involvement when children were in primary
schooling (ISCED 1).8
We analysed test outcomes in mathematics, reading, science and some non-cognitive
measures of performance.9 The results for the different test scores are sufficiently simi-
lar that we report in this paper only those for mathematics. Results for the other tests
are available on request from the corresponding author.
We analyse students in the full set of countries in the PISA and then group the
countries into five subsets: OECD economies, European Union economies, Asian
economies, other high income economies, and middle income economies.10
Countries can appear in more than one subset in our groups: for instance the
EU countries are also part of the OECD country subset. We differentiate the
Asian countries because five of the top ten scoring countries in PISA 2009 were
Asian, which raises questions about how they differ from other countries in edu-
cational practices.11
3.2. Empirical framework
At the heart of our analysis are estimates of variants of the following equation:
Tisc ¼ a1Fisc þ a2FPisc þ b1Xisc þ b2Ssc þ b3SDsc þ lc þ eisc ð1Þ
where T is the test score of student i in school s of country c; F is a measure of family
background characteristics for student i in school s of country c; FP is a measure of the
parenting practices for student i in school s of country c; X is a vector of the student’s
characteristics, for student i in school s of country c; S is a vector of the policies and
practices of school s of country c; SD is a vector of dummy variables for each school in
7 The data set is publicly available from the PISA website: http://pisa2009.acer.edu.au/.
8 Throughout, we use the sampling weights in the database as described in PISA Technical Report 2009
(OECD, 2012a). To deal with missing observations, we kept all students with complete test score data and
imputed the values of missing explanatory variables by using mean values and including in the regression
an indicator for missing data (see Hanushek et al., 2013).
9 Our analysis of non-cognitive learning outcomes considered indicators related to disruptive behaviour
and two psychological traits central to the five factors model (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Peterson and
Viarengo, 2011): openness to learning (attitude towards school) and locus of control (self-confidence in
ICT high-level tasks). Non-cognitive skills have been largely neglected in the cross-country studies due to
the paucity of information available and difficulties of measurement (Woessmann et al., 2007; Brunello
and Schlotter, 2011).
10 Footnote 6 provides the list of countries in our analysis. Korea and Japan are Asian countries members
of the OECD. Mexico is a middle-income country member of the OECD. For the purpose of the analysis
that follows Korea and Japan are included in the Asian group and Mexico in the middle-income group.
11 The Asian countries have large shares of students at the proficient level 5 (OECD, 2010b). PISA classi-
fies students into five proficiency levels, ‘moderate’ performers achieve proficiency levels of 2 or 3 whereas
‘top’ performers achieve proficiency levels of 5 or 6. OECD (2010a, p. 8; Peterson et al., 2011, p. 8). More
than 20% of students in Korea, Japan and Hong Kong perform above proficiency level 5 (OECD, 2010c,
p. 63) and above the advanced international benchmark of 625 or better. Cross-national surveys of learn-
ing achievement show that Korea, Macao, Shanghai combine top scores with levels of inequality below
the OECD average (e.g., OECD, 2010b, p. 53).
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the data set;12 lc is a vector of country dummy variables; e is an error term;
13 and a1,
a2, b1, b2, b3 are vectors of coefficients to be estimated.
Because PISA gathers data on test scores from about 35 students in each school, we
have two ways to examine the relation between the schools students attend and test
scores. The first way is a ‘sibling’ type estimate based on estimating the school level
dummies SD. To obtain the fixed school effect we omit the policy and practice vector
in Equation (1) (that is, we set b2 at 0). Just as sibling studies of family background
effects use the fact that siblings grow up in the same family to estimate the variance in
outcomes associated with family background without measuring that background,14
the PISA data allow us to estimate school effects through the similarity of outcomes
among students in the same school absent measures of school policies and practices.
The second way to examine the effects of schools on outcomes is to estimate the coeffi-
cients in the S vector of policies and practices in Equation (1). To do this we omit the
school dummy variables (that is, set b3 at 0). The variance in test scores due to meas-
ured policies/practices will invariably fall short of the variance in test scores in school
fixed effects, since the measured variables do not account for all of the differences
among schools.
If students were randomly assigned to schools, the difference between the contribu-
tion to the variance of the estimated school fixed effect and the contribution to the
variance in scores associated with observable school practices and policies would
reflect the effect of schooling on outcomes through mechanisms rather than observ-
able policies and practices that affect student education. But, as noted in our discus-
sion of tracking, the assignment of students among schools is not random. Students of
similar ability are likely to be sorted among schools, producing school fixed effects
independent of what schools actually do for students.15
To help differentiate the variance in test scores among schools due to sorting from
the variance to what schools do to students, we first examine the effect of different
measures of sorting on variances and then examine the effect of explicit policies on
the variance of schools under different sorting regimes.
Approaching the problem from the sorting perspective, we contrast differences in
the school fixed effects on test outcomes between countries with early sorting policies
and countries with late sorting policies. We expect greater variation in the average
12 In the estimation of the school fixed effect models country fixed effects are absorbed by school fixed
effects.
13 Clustering-robust linear regression (CRLR) has been used in the estimation to estimate standard errors
given the fact that the error term has both school-level and student-level components.
14 Bjorklund and Salvanes (2010) report that factors shared by siblings explain more than 50% of the
overall variation in years of schooling for children in a sample of developed countries.
15 If different schools had no discernible effect on student performance, parental efforts to get their stu-
dents into better schools would make little sense in terms of their education, so sorting practices by parents
are presumably indicative of actual educational effects. Demonstrably better school effects on students
should induce parents to make greater efforts to get able students into higher quality schools. We do not
explore this interaction in this paper.
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scores among schools in countries with early tracking policies than among schools in
countries without those policies. Following a similar logic, we also contrast variance in
test scores among schools with different admission policies and openness to residential
and parental choice to see whether those measures of sorting account for the bulk of
school fixed effects.
Approaching the problem from the perspective of how schools affect student per-
formance, we consider the contribution of school fixed effects and measures of explicit
policies on test scores in countries/schools with different sorting policies. Large school
fixed effects in countries or among schools without tracking policies would indicate that
something other than tracking underlies school differences. But even more telling
would be evidence that explicit policies and practices affect outcomes similarly among
countries with and without tracking. It is difficult to argue that tracking is the whole
story for school fixed effects if the evidence shows sizeable effects absent tracking and
relations between test scores and school policies or practices under different sorting
regimes.
4. SCHOOLS EFFECTS: SORTING VERSUS SCHOOL POLICIES AND
PRACTICES
4.1. The role of schools
Table 1 records statistical properties of the maths test score on which we focus.
Column 1 records the mean and standard deviation (in brackets below the mean) of
the test score in all the countries in the data set and in countries in the five country
groupings. The mean scores for the poorest countries in our sample, ‘middle income
countries’ by the World Bank definition, fall below those of the other and higher
income countries. The mean scores for the Asian countries are higher than the scores
for other countries. The coefficient of variation of the test scores in column 2 shows
modestly higher variation in scores among the middle income countries than others
and modestly lower variation in test scores for the Asian countries than for the others.
Variation of scores is, however, large among all groups, which reflects the wide
distribution of scores among students within countries.
The columns under the heading ‘Percentage of Variance in Scores’ record the pro-
portion of the variance in test scores associated with country, measures of background,
and schools.16 The proportions of variance are calculated separately for each of these
factors. The column labelled country shows the percentage of variance from
regressions of student test scores on country dummies. The column labelled
background shows the percentage of variance from regressions of test scores on the
16 Standard errors in the empirical analysis here and in the remainder of the study are corrected for clus-
tering.
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family background measures listed in the table note. The column labelled schools
shows the percentage of variance from regressions of test scores on school dummies.
Country contributes substantially to the variance in the whole data set because the
middle income countries have much lower test scores than the other countries. But
within each of the groups country is associated with only a small proportion of the
variance in scores. Background factors have a substantial impact on the variance in
the overall sample and within every category but contribute least to the variance
among the Asian countries. The largest source of variation in test scores in Table 1,
Table 1. Test scores and analysis of variance decomposition of test scores:
country, family background and school effects, PISA 2009
Mean and variation in scoresa
Percentage of variance in scores
due to specified factorsc
Country groupsg
(number of countries and
students in parentheses)
Average test score
(standard deviation)
Coefficient
of variationb
Country
effectsd
(C)
Background
effectse (B)
School
effectsf
(S)
Allh (74; 515,956) 449.47
(104.74)
23.30 0.322 0.334 0.618
OECD (31; 249,125) 489.30
(94.54)
19.32 0.053 0.276 0.435
EU 15+i (17; 150,696) 498.24
(95.23)
19.11 0.024 0.291 0.475
Asian (7; 38,095) 540.28
(96.02)
17.77 0.026 0.143 0.502
Other high income
(8; 44,384)
465.71
(86.47)
18.57 0.021 0.191 0.348
Middle income
(27; 179,366)
388.28
(81.22)
20.92 0.076 0.258 0.522
Note: Sampling probability weights have been used in order to provide descriptive statistics representative for
each country
aTest scores in mathematics here and in the remaining of the analysis unless otherwise specified.
bCoefficient of variation (CoV) is a normalized measure of dispersion calculated as the standard deviation divided
by the mean score.
cVariance has been extracted as the share of test score variation explained by the model (ANOVA/R2). In the
underlying regression test score is a function of country dummies. The figure has been divided by test score vari-
ance.
dIn the underlying regression test score is a function of country dummies. The figure has been divided by test
score variance.
eIn the underlying regression test score is a function of the family background measure, student-level and school-
level controls. Here family background has been proxied by the ESCS index. The figure has been divided by test
score variance. The ANOVA analysis has also been carried out by using the components of the ESCS unrestrict-
edly. Results are consistent with the analysis presented here and available from the authors.
fIn the underlying regression test score is a function of school dummies. The figure has been divided by test score
variance.
gOnly a low-income country participated in the PISA 2009 study: Kyrgyzstan, so we did not include this group.
The analysis has been carried out for this country and is available from the authors upon request.
hThis group includes 72 countries and 2 Indian states.
iThis category includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland.
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however, is the school the student attends.17 The regression of test scores on the school
dummies explains a large proportion of the variation of scores in all groups. Estimates
of the contribution of schooling to the variance of test scores separately by country
confirm this result for all countries, albeit with variation in the magnitudes.18 That the
students’ school is the biggest measurable contributor to the variance of test scores
motivates ensuing analysis.
The first question we ask about this empirical result is the extent to which school
fixed effects result from national tracking policies or other sorting practices as opposed
to the potential impacts of schools on learning by students. If the variance in test
scores among schools were due largely to sorting of students by prior ability/know-
ledge, the school effects would arguably be more indicative of efforts to preserve exist-
ing social connections and thus provide little insight into educational policy. If, by
contrast, a sizeable part of the school fixed effects is due to school policies and prac-
tices, the finding directs attention at the impacts of measured policies and practices
and ways to transfer best practices to more schools, and to further investigation of
policies and practices that the PISA does not measure.
As a first step toward measuring the extent of sorting versus educational policies/
practices on the school fixed effects result we built on the research referenced in
Section 2 to estimate the effect of national policies toward tracking of students into
higher level schools on the variance of test scores. We gathered data on the first age at
which students move from one level of schooling to the next level in different coun-
tries.19 Researchers who study national tracking systems use these data to divide coun-
tries into two groups: countries which sort students at ages less than 16 are viewed as
having tracking systems while countries with a first age of sorting above age 16 are
viewed as not having a tracking system.20 Given that the students in the PISA are 15–
16 years old, this definition works well with our data. But rather than settling for a
dichotomous division, we created a more refined measure of tracking by differentiat-
ing countries by the first age of movement to a different school. If tracking policies sort
students by abilities and these measures reflect those policies, we expect that the vari-
ance of test scores among schools will be higher in countries that tracked students early
in their lives than in countries that tracked them later in their lives. By contrast, the
within-school variance of test scores should be lower in the tracking countries than in
the non-tracking countries.
17 This can be explained either by the effect that schools have on determining student’s learning outcomes
or by some sort of self-selection that affects the student composition into the different schools. In the ana-
lysis presented in the following sections of the paper different possible explanations are going to be invest-
igated.
18 These estimates are available from the authors.
19 First age at which selection takes place in the education system (OECD, 2005, Table D6.1; Hanushek
and Woessmann, 2006; Brunello and Checchi, 2007; Woessmann, 2005b; in addition to this, Professor
Ludger Woessmann kindly shared with us his international dataset on tracking acquired through detailed
personal inquiries). This information refers to the policy set at the national level.
20 For a review of the existing studies see Hanushek and Woessmann (2011a, section 4.4.4).
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Accordingly we examined differences in the relation between test scores and schools
at the level of countries and at schools within countries. At the country level, we calcu-
lated the coefficients on the vector of school dummies from Equation (1), absent meas-
ures of school practices and policies. The estimated coefficients measure the fixed
effects impact of each school. This is equivalent to taking the average performance of
a school adjusted for the effects of student background factors. Then we related the
estimated school effects to the rank of the school in the country’s distribution of school
scores from highest to lowest. The basic notion is that tracking should produce a
steeper relation between the ranking of schools in the country’s distribution of schools
by test scores and the estimated school effects.
The regression of the estimated school fixed effects on the rank of the school for
each country yields a coefficient a1 for country i that shows how much being higher in
the distribution of schools affects the test score:21
b03sc ¼ a1Rsc þ esc ð2Þ
where b03sc is the vector of estimated fixed school effects for school s in country c
(i.e., the mean test score in the school adjusted for the other variables in regres-
sion (1)) and Rsc is the rank of school in the distribution of test scores for the
school s in country c.
Because the PISA sample includes several countries with huge numbers of
schools – Mexico (1,535 schools), Italy (1,097 schools), Brazil (947 schools) and
Canada (978 schools) – the range of ranks for those countries diverges hugely
from the range of ranks for the typical PISA country that has in the order of
100–200 schools. The result is that estimates of Equation 2 for the countries
with huge numbers of schools give much smaller estimated a1 coefficients than
for the other countries. To deal with this scaling issue and standardize the data
for cross-country analysis, we created a new data set consisting of the estimated
fixed effect for each decile of schools for each country.22 This gives us 10 aver-
age test scores for each decile and the ranks from 1 to 10 for the deciles for
each country. We then regressed the score of the 1st decile, 2nd decile, . . .,
10th decile school on the ranks of their corresponding decile. This gives us a
slope coefficient for each country estimated on a similar number of observations
and with a similar range of the right-hand side rank variable.
21 Summarizing the relation between test score and school ranking with a single regression parameter in
this manner forces a simple linear relation onto the rank-score curve. The actual curves show more com-
plex logistic patterns, which depend on the nature of sorting, groups sorted, the number of students in
schools and the bounds on school scores (which lie between the lowest and highest PISA scores multiplied
by the number of students in bottom and top schools). But for the purposes of examining whether or not
formal tracking systems steepen the rank score relation, the linear analysis suffices.
22 We thank the discussants for their suggestion on how to deal with this problem.
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Figure 1 graphs the scores of schools against the ranks of schools in the curves for
the five countries with the largest gradients and the five countries with the smallest
gradients based on the decile regressions.23 By construction the curve rises monoton-
ically, but the gradients of the rank-score curve vary substantially among countries.
Countries with the largest gradient have an early tracking system whereas countries
200
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Czech Republic Japan Malta Shanghai Slovenia
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Figure 1. School rankings and average test score, PISA 2009 (a) Top 5 – coun-
tries with largest estimated coefficient on school rank; (b) Bottom 5 – countries
with smallest estimated coefficient on school rank
Notes: The picture at the top (bottom) shows the school ranking and the related average school test score for the
five countries with the largest (smallest) estimated coefficient on school rank. The graph for all the 74 countries
and economies in our sample – including Costa Rica, for which the data on tracking is not available – is available
from the authors.
23 The estimated coefficient on school rank for each country in our sample is available from the authors.
The coefficients have been extracted from the country-specific regressions run at school-level. The graph
for the remaining countries and territories in our sample is available from the authors.
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with the lowest gradient have late tracking systems, Portugal being a noticeable excep-
tion.24 The estimated slopes for countries are available from the authors and show
high gradients for countries of Continental Europe (France, Germany, Hungary, the
Netherlands), heterogeneous gradients for Asian countries and smaller gradients for
Anglo-Saxon (Australia, Canada, Ireland) and Nordic European countries (Denmark,
Finland, Norway).
To check the robustness of the country ordering by the gradient of the rank-score
figure, we estimated rank-score curves for countries in three other data sets in periods
close to the PISA 2009: TIMSS 2011 4th grade mathematics students (41 countries
overlap), TIMSS 2011 8th grade mathematics students (30 countries overlap), and
PIRLS 2011, 4th grade reading (19 countries overlap).25 Differences among the stud-
ies in design and structure as well as grade groups, notwithstanding the ordering of
countries by the estimated rank-score gradient is consistent with that in PISA, with
the greatest similarity between PISA and the TIMSS 4th grade, TIMSS 8th grade test
and the least with the PIRLS 4th grade test.
By the logic of tracking policies, countries that track students earlier should have
steeper gradients linking school fixed effects to the rank of schools in the distribution
of scores than countries. Similarly, the proportion of the variance of student test scores
due to school effects as opposed to within school variance should be higher in coun-
tries which do more tracking.
The regressions in Panel A in Table 2 test this expectation with two measures of
country tracking policies. The first measure is the standard measure of tracking sys-
tems in the cross-country literature: a dummy variable for whether the first age at
which students move school levels is below 16. The second measure is the ‘tracking
index’ based on the age that countries begin tracking is available from the authors.
The ages vary from 10 to 18, but our index reverse codes them to be consistent with
the dummy variable measure so that higher numbers reflect stronger tracking (i.e., the
index is 18 for schools that send students to another school level at age 10, 17 for those
that do so at age 11, and so on). The Appendix provides a description of these track-
ing variables used for the analysis.
The first two columns of Panel A of Table 2 give the results of regressing the estim-
ated gradients of school test scores on school rank on the specified measures of track-
ing. The first regression excludes covariates for student characteristics. The second
regression includes country averages of the covariates listed in the table note.26 The
positive coefficients on the tracking dummy variable and on the tracking index show
that earlier sorting of students into another level of schooling is associated with a
24 Age at first selection in Portugal is equal to 15.
25 TIMSS refers to the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study whereas PIRLS refers to
the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study. Both studies are administered by the International
Study Center, Lynch School of Education, Boston College, and the International Association for the
Evaluation of Educational Achievement. More information is available at http://timss.bc.edu/.
26 Descriptive statistics of these covariates are presented in Tables A1 and 6.
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larger gradient of test scores on school rank. A high ranking school has a higher test
score compared to others in the same country when the country tracks earlier relative
to a high ranking school in a country which tracks students later.
The next two columns give the results of regressing the ratio of the variance in test
scores attributed to the school dummies over total variance in each country on the
two measures of tracking policies with and without covariates for country character-
istics of students. These regressions show that the proportion of variance between
schools is larger among countries with lower ages of sorting.
Panel B of the table shifts from country level regressions to school level regressions
to assess the effects of tracking policies on test scores. Here, we regress the estimated
school fixed effects on the rank of each school in their own country and on country
dummy variables separately for countries with early tracking policies and for countries
with later tracking policies. This specification forces a single coefficient on school rank
for all of the countries in each of the groups. To deal with the different number of
schools in this analysis, we have weighted the observations by 1/number of schools in
a country. The results confirm the regression findings in the country data. The slope
of the test score on the rank of schools is higher in countries with an early tracking pol-
icy than in countries without such a policy when the tracking measure is the sole
explanatory variable and when we include the covariates listed in the table note. We
also regressed the test score on the rank of school, the age-based measure of the track-
ing policy and the interaction of the rank with the policy measure. If tracking pro-
duces a steeper gradient, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term should be
positive. As the last line of Table 2 shows, this is the case. Countries with stronger
tracking policies sort students among schools in ways that produce greater differentia-
tion in average test scores among schools.
The variance in test scores among schools in countries that do not track students
before age 15 cannot be associated with explicit tracking policies. To be sure, not all
of the variance in test scores among schools in these countries will be due to true
school impacts on students, but the school fixed effects in these countries should be
more reflective of true school impacts than the school fixed effects in countries with
early tracking policies. Subtracting the maximum estimate of the effect of tracking on
the variance of test scores in Table 2 – the 14 point impact in the single variate regres-
sion – from the Table 1 estimated impact of school fixed effects on the variance of test
scores of 62% would reduce the fixed school share of the variance in test scores among
students to 48%. This still leaves schools as the major factor associated with student
test scores.
4.2. Other sources of sorting
Per the discussion of sorting earlier, students may sort among schools through mech-
anisms beyond national tracking policies and thus contribute to school fixed effects.
Some countries allow parents greater choice in their enrolment. Schools may have
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Table 2. Estimates on effect of country tracking practices on gradient of effect
of rank-school school-fixed-effects and percentage of country variance in test
scores, by country tracking practices
Panel A: Country level regressions
Coefficient from regression of
gradient of school test score–
school rank on tracking policies
Country-level regressionsb
(n = 68)
Coefficient of percentage of
country test score variance
attributable to variance in scores
across schools on tracking
policies
(n = 68)
Measure of tracking
in countrya
Single variate
regression
Regression with
covariatesc
Single variate
regression
Regression with
covariatesc
School tracking policy
Dummy = 1 for tracking
4.12*** 2.59*** 14.40*** 7.07***
(0.92) (0.95) (3.16) (2.58)
Tracking
Index based on age
1.11*** 0.83*** 3.74*** 2.54***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.79) (0.78)
Panel B: School level regression
Regression coefficient of school-fixed-effects on
school rank, with country dummiesd
(number of schools = 17,539)
Country group
Single variate
regression
Regression with
covariatese
School tracking policy = 0
[no. schools=6,288]
0.25*** 0.20***
(0.003) (0.004)
School tracking policy = 1f
[no. schools=11,251]
0.36*** 0.25***
(0.005) (0.005)
Rank interacted with
tracking index based on
Age * Rank [all schools]
0.009*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Notes: Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes
significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
aAnalysis for 68 countries for which we have tracking information. Basic relations in the data similar to those with
regression results for the entire sample. First age at which selection takes place in the education system. This
information refers to the policy set at the national level. Several sources have been used to extract this informa-
tion including Professor Woessmann who kindly shared his dataset with us that was constructed through detailed
country-specific inquiries (OECD, 2005, Table D6.1; OECD, 2010d, Table IV 3.2a; Hanushek and Woessmann,
2006; Brunello and Checchi, 2007, Schuetz et al., 2008; Woessmann, 2005b; country-specific sources for Malta
and India). Information on tracking was not available for the following countries: Costa Rica, Georgia, Kazakh-
stan, Mauritius, Miranda – Venezuela, Serbia.
bThe analysis is carried out at the country-level and the dependent variable is the country-specific coefficient on
school rank. These country-specific coefficients are available from the authors.
cThese are country averages of: student’s age, gender, grade, whether the language of test is the main language
spoken at home, whether the student lives with two parents (natural or otherwise), immigrant status, parents’
immigrant status, total school enrolment, dummies for community size where the school is located, index of
socio-economic status (ESCS). Descriptive statistics related to these variables are presented in Tables A1 and 6.
Student sampling weights are included.
dThe dependent variable is school fixed effects. The coefficient presented in the table is related to the school
ranking. Country dummies are included. School-level regressions are weighted by 1/number of school.
eThese are school averages of the control variables described in note c.
fSchool tracking is equal to 1 if age at first selection is below 16.
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selective admission policies, limiting enrolment to high performing students. Parents
may affect student placement by residing in areas with reputedly higher quality
schools.
The PISA principals’ questionnaire contains three questions which allow us to
assess the potential impact of these forms of selection on the estimated school fixed
effects. The first question relates to the governance of schools. It asks whether the
school is public or private. Private schools are defined as ‘schools managed directly or
indirectly by a non-government organization (e.g. a church, trade union, business, or
other private institution)’. The PISA database also provides information on the
sources of funding of the school. Following Woessmann (2009) we classify the public
and private sources of school funding.27 Assuming that families with more academic-
ally able students get their children into schools with stronger academic reputations,
which in some countries are private institutions, we expect a positive association
between private schools and test scores and, assuming those schools have greater
homogeneity of students than others, a smaller coefficient of variation than in other
schools.28 The second question, extracted from the school principals’ questionnaire, is
‘how often is a student’s record of academic performance (including placement tests)
considered when students are admitted to your school?’ Schools that take account of
performance in admissions policy should have a more homogeneous student body
and correspondingly lower variance of scores within the school than other schools.
The PISA has a third question regarding school policies that has a more ambiguous
relation to the variance of school test scores. It asked principals ‘How often is resid-
ence in a particular area considered when students are admitted to your school?’ If
residence29 is a strong factor in admission, a school will likely admit nearly all students
in its catchment area – the less able as well as the more able, and thus be less selective
on academic performance, producing greater within school variance in test scores and
smaller variance in school fixed effects. On the other side, if wealthier and more
educated families live in different catchments than poorer and less educated families,
such a policy would increase the variance in school effects. If families with more
academically able students move to areas with better schools, the dependence of
residence on schools would add yet another sorting contribution to the variance of
27 Specifically, we classify as public funding the share of funding provided by the ‘Government (includes
departments, local, regional, state and national)’ and as private the funding provided by the remaining cat-
egories (‘Student fees or school charges paid by parents’, ‘Benefactors, donations, bequests, sponsorships,
parent fund raising’ and ‘Other’).
28 Given differences in the management and funding of private and public schools across countries, this
expectation may hold only in part of the sample.
29 In order to further examine the sorting mechanism through residential location the empirical analysis
has been carried out for a finer set of countries. These four countries do not have national tracking policies
but two are more egalitarian (Finland and Norway) whereas in the other two residential sorting appears to
play a more important role (United Kingdom and United States). Results related to this analysis are avail-
able from the authors upon request. We also acknowledge the fact that other sorting mechanisms may
play an important role (e.g., parental choices related to public vs private schools).
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scores among schools. The Appendix describes how we used the PISA questions to
construct the variables that we use in ensuing regression analysis.
Table 3 examines the relation between these potential contributors to test scores
and variation of scores within schools in two steps. The column labelled ‘share of
schools with practice’ shows that almost two-thirds of the schools in the sample are in
countries with tracking systems that move students to a higher level of school before
the age of 16; that 18% of the schools are private; that 30% report selective admis-
sions; and that 35% report giving heavy weight to enrolling students in the relevant
geographic area.
The regression coefficients show the estimated impact of the various policies on
three outcome measures: the average test score of a school (column 1), school fixed
effects, which is the average score corrected for the characteristics of students (column
2) and the coefficient of variation in test scores within a school (column 3). The index
of tracking (a country-level policy) has strong and consistent effects for all the
Table 3. Regression coefficients of test scores, school fixed effects and coeffi-
cient of variation of scores within schools on sorting mechanisms, PISA 2009a
School test
score
School fixed
effectsc
Coefficient of variation
of scores within schools
Variablesb
Share of schools
with practice (1) (2) (3)
Trackingd 63.79 44.56*** 43.53*** –1.26***
(2.133) (2.196) (0.133)
Private schoole 17.56 –0.11 –1.23 –0.47
(4.354) (4.002) (0.355)
Selective admissions 30.17 12.31*** 12.78*** –0.81***
(2.344) (2.312) (0.242)
Selective residence 35.39 –6.70** –7.81** 0.19
(2.824) (3.082) (0.238)
Constant 684.84*** 56.31 43.64**
(203.405) (220.866) (18.878)
Observations 17,252 17,252 17,252
R-squared 0.736 0.674 0.158
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country-level in parentheses. Significance level: ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
aAll regressions at school-level. Covariates in each regression include country dummies. The following controls
are included: school-level average student age, gender, grade, whether the language of test is main language
spoken at home, whether student lives with two parents, immigrant status, parents’ immigrant status, index of
socio-economic cultural status, school enrollment, dummies for community size where the school is located.
School sampling weights are used. The analysis includes all the countries for which information on tracking is
available. France excluded as the school questionnaire was not administered. 134 schools have no school-level
variance as they have only one student.
bA full description of variables is provided in the Appendix.
cSchool fixed effects have been extracted from the student-level regression of test scores on school dummies and
child/parents control characteristics.
dThe tracking index is used as explanatory variable. The share of practice refers to the share of schools where
age at first selection is below 16.
ePrivate schools refer to the management of schools. Results related to the governance of funding are available
from the authors.
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variables. It raises school test scores and the estimated school fixed effect and reduces
the within school variation of scores – just what a tracking system should do. The pri-
vate school variable has negligible insignificant effects and is not a major determinant
of outcomes globally, though private schools may have substantial positive or negative
relations to outcomes in some countries. The second most powerful statistical relation-
ship is for the selective admissions policies, which like national tracking increases
school test scores/estimated school fixed effects variables while reducing the coeffi-
cient of variation of within-school test scores.30 Finally, the selective residence variable
is associated with lower test scores/school fixed effects but has no effect on within-
school variance. Measuring the share of variation in school fixed effects explained by
the four sorting mechanisms as the difference in R2 between the school fixed effects
Equation (2), with and without the four sorting mechanisms, suggests that those fac-
tors account for a negligible amount of the variance in the fixed effects: dropping the
variables reduces the R2 by just 0.007 points. Still, the PISA questions are sufficiently
weak and incomplete measures of sorting across schools, that the Table 3 analysis
does not rule out sorting having larger contributions to the school fixed effects in the
PISA test data.31 Moreover, for readers interested in sorting per se, our analysis leaves
out a completely different channel of sorting: the assignment of students with differing
abilities and interests to classes within schools (which is substantial in Canada and the
United States – Oakes, 2005), that may affect the average level of scores and variance
of scores within schools. For our purposes, the safest conclusion is that analysis of
observable factors relating to the sorting of students among schools leaves a large vari-
ation in school fixed effects that could potentially reflect differences in school policies
and practices, to which we turn next.
4.3. School policies and practices
This section seeks to identify specific school-level policies and practices associated with
the substantial role of school fixed effects in the variance of student test scores found
in Table 1. We choose the words ‘associated with’ rather than causes or determines
because policies and practices are chosen by schools, for reasons about which the
PISA provides no insight, rather than being randomly assigned by researchers or
some natural experiment. This means that correlations could result not only from the
effect of the policies/practices on test scores but also from the effect of test scores (or
unmeasured attributes of students or schools associated with those scores) on selection
30 Similar results are found in an alternative estimation when we include the PISA variable related to pri-
vate funding.
31 We note that the selective residence question does not capture parental/student residential choices
linked to school admission; none of the measures captures sorting of teachers; the private school dummy
variable is a crude measure that does not distinguish between elite private schools and private schools for
troubled students, nor for difference among schools in the public sector, as laid out by Nechyba (2011)
and discussed briefly in Section 2.
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of policies. Finding that certain policies/practices are highly related to test scores
while others are not suggests directions for further work and areas for policy
consideration. To the extent that schools select policies that work for their students,
positive associations between policies and scores should reflect positive linkages in
both ways and thus at the minimum identify the likely effect of the policy on scores.
The 2009 PISA data on school policies and teaching practices offer what is argu-
ably the best cross-country school-based data to identify policies that work and those
that do not. PISA obtains information on policies and practices from two sources.
First, from principals who report on the presence of a large number of school
characteristics and policies.32 Second, from students who report on the way they were
taught in school. If either or both of these sets of information are related to the
estimated school effects that dominate the PISA test scores we would have suggestive
evidence that policies and practices matter and (conditional on likely dual causality)
the ones that appear most promising for improving school performance.
Table 4 presents our analysis of the effect of school level policies or practices on the
school fixed effects test scores for the 17,252 schools in the PISA data set. The column
labelled ‘Measures of School Policies or Practices’ gives the specific policies and prac-
tices on which we focus. For ease of analysis, we grouped the school policies into three
areas: school selectivity, school autonomy and accountability; and school resources, in which we
include the attributes of teachers; and grouped the measures of practices into
approaches to teaching, reported by students; and staff attitude, reported by principals. The
Appendix provides the details on the questionnaire items we used.
For starters, the PISA data shows substantial differences in school policies and prac-
tices across countries as well as within countries (see Appendix Table A2). Principals
in schools in Asian countries report having greater autonomy over curriculum and
assessment but lower autonomy over resource allocation compared to principals in
the OECD countries. Asian principals also report having greater instructional mater-
ial, laboratory equipment and availability of computers and software for instruction
and higher extra-curricular activities. Nearly 72% of Asian principals report academic
selectivity in admissions compared to 33% of principals in the OECD countries.33
And nearly all the Asian principals report that their teachers are fully certified with
college degrees compared to 84% of the principals in the advanced OECD countries.
Another major difference between these countries are that 44% of principals in
OECD countries report that they are evaluated by achievement data and 43% report
32 We acknowledge the fact that there may be some measurement error or limited variability in some pol-
icy variables (e.g., Dustmann et al., 2012). We also acknowledge the fact even though we tried to focus on
those policies that are regarded as important determinants of educational attainment we are aware of the
fact that we are not able to account for all the existing policies. We also looked closely at other sources
(e.g., World Bank-Saber database, Eurydice reports) but given the nature of our database that includes
both developing countries and advanced economies we could not find further consistent and comparable
policy information.
33 By contrast, 8% of Asian schools report ability grouping between classes within schools compared to
11% of schools in OECD countries.
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using achievement data to evaluate school teachers. These numbers exceed the 18%
of principals in Asian countries who say achievement data is used in their evaluations
and the 34% who say they use it to evaluate teachers.
On the student side, questions regarding the extent to which students relate new
information to prior knowledge and knowledge acquired in other situations, which
PISA summarizes in an index of elaboration, is significantly lower in Asian countries.
In addition, to our surprise Asian students report less use of memorization than
their OECD counterparts. The index of control of learning strategies consists of
techniques used by students to assess the effectiveness of their learning. It includes
activities such as an understanding of what students need to learn, as well as self-
supervision of learning and comprehension checks. It is on average higher among
the OECD countries.
To see if any of these policies or practices affects test scores, we estimated Equation
(1) with inclusion of variables for the policies and practices in place of school dummy
variables, and with country dummy variables to pick up the large cross-country
variation in the data.
Column 1 in Table 4 gives the regression coefficients linking the average school test
scores to the policy and practice variables. Column 2 gives the coefficients for a similar
equation linking the variation in test scores within schools on the policy and practice
variables. Analysing the two columns together provides a way to probe potential
causal links. For instance, factors associated with higher test scores and lower within-
skill variability are likely to reflect sorting as well as other factors; while factors that
affect levels of test scores but not the coefficient of variation are more likely to reflect
the impact of practices or the effect of test scores on the choice of policy.
The results on academic selectivity policies of schools reproduce the pattern in
Table 3: higher test scores and smaller within-school variance of scores for selective
schools. The measure of within-school grouping of students by ability between classes
also has opposite effects on the average test score and its variance but it reduces the
average test score and increases within-school variance. Such a pattern could result
from such groupings harming the lower-ability students by reducing their opportunity
to learn from peers. But the pattern could also reflect the endogenous decision of
schools to sort students by ability. Schools with weaker student bodies might be more
likely to separate the more able from the rest. The PISA data do not allow us to differ-
entiate these interpretations.
The coefficients for the school autonomy and accountability variables show some
associations between policies and the level of scores (column 1) but essentially no rela-
tion between policies and the within-school coefficient of variation (column 2). The
key positive relation for the level of test scores is in whether or not a school publicly
posts information on student achievement data.34 The biggest negative relation is in
34 The achievement data includes ‘aggregated school or grade-level test scores or grades, or graduation
rates’ (PISA 2009, School Questionnaire, p. 20).
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using achievement data to evaluate principals, which may reflect school authorities
relying more on achievement when schools are performing poorly than any adverse
effect of this policy on educational outcomes.
The coefficients on the measures of school resources show that variables that reflect
greater resources are positively associated with levels of scores and weakly negatively
associated with the dispersion of scores. The most striking association is for the student
to teacher ratio, which has a significant negative coefficient on test scores and signific-
ant positive coefficient on the variance of scores. Noting that the PISA measure is stu-
dents/teachers rather than the more common teacher/student ratio, these results
support the STAR finding that a higher teacher student ratio raises average perform-
ance rather than the negligible relationship found in the bulk of the literature cited
earlier. A one SD change in the student-teacher ratio is associated with a 0.03 SD
change in the test score. That higher teacher-student ratios also reduce the variance
of scores makes it a ‘win–win’ in this context.
The most striking results in the table relate to the association between student reports
on ‘Approaches to Learning’ and test scores. These are the strongest and most consist-
ent patterns in the table. Memorization and use of elaboration are associated with low
test scores (a one SD increase in memorization is associated with a 0.17 SD reduction
in test scores; a one SD increase in elaboration is associated with a 0.09 SD reduction
in test scores); whereas use of comprehension checks are associated with higher test
scores (a one SD increase is associated with 0.27 SD increase in test scores). There are
two possible reasons for such strong relations. One possibility is that teaching practices
that stress comprehension rather than memorization produce better results on the
PISA tests that stress use of knowledge in practical settings. The other possibility is that
the correlation reflects schools with better students eschewing memorization and elab-
oration techniques in favour of comprehension checks. With respect to the within-
school variance of test scores, the estimated coefficients show that: memorization and
elaboration are associated with greater variation while comprehension checks are asso-
ciated with lower variation. Finally, there are no clear patterns in the relations between
the principal reports of staff attitudes and test scores or variance in scores within schools.
To get a better sense of the robustness of the estimated patterns across countries
with different tracking policies, we divided the sample into groups: schools in countries
with a tracking system (defined by the dichotomous tracking variable described in Sec-
tion 4.1 and those without such a system. Since schools without tracking deal with
more heterogeneity in their student bodies, they are likely to rely on the policies and
practices listed in the table than those with tracking, possibly with different effects. In
fact, test scores in the schools without tracking appear to be more responsive to pol-
icies than test scores in schools with tracking and sometimes with differently estimated
signs on the variables. For instance, the posting test score variable has a large positive
effect for schools without tracking compared to a smaller insignificant scores for
schools with tracking while four of the measures of school resources obtain statistically
significant coefficients for the non-trackers compared to a single measure – the
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student-teacher ratio – for schools with tracking. The overall pattern shows up in the
noticeably higher R2 in the column 3 regression than in the column 4 regression.
Whether the causal pattern runs from the test scores to the policies or from the pol-
icies to the test scores, the differences between the two groups are a warning sign that
similar policies may be associated with different outcomes depending on other charac-
teristics of the school system and country.
One set of variables in Table 4, however, shows no relation between schools in
countries with tracking and schools in countries without tracking. This is the
‘approaches to learning’ variables that measure the way students say they are being
taught. Here, the variables have similar highly significant effects regardless of national
tracking policies. This robust result suggests that the mode of teaching may be the key
to understanding the strong school effects in the data. Future research into school
practices may profit from investing more in obtaining student views of how the school
operates than in giving extended questionnaires to principals.
A parallel way to examine the extent to which school fixed effects are associated
with what schools do as opposed to the sorting of students among schools is to exam-
ine directly the link between estimated fixed effects and policies and practices. To do
this we run the following regression:
b03sc ¼ a1Ssc þ esc ð3Þ
where b03sc is the vector of estimated fixed school effects for school s in country c and
Ssc is the vector of school policies and practices in school s in country c.
Table 5 summarizes the results from estimating variants of Equation (3). Since the
estimated coefficients on specific policies and practices are similar to those in
Table 4,35 the table gives the residual variances from the regressions and the sum-
mary R2 statistics for different specifications. These estimates tells us the extent to
which the whole set of policies and practices help explain the fixed effects. The line
labelled school fixed effects gives the total variance in the estimated fixed coefficients.
Line 1 shows that with no other variables in the equation, the vector of policies and
practices by itself accounts for 44.3% of the variance. Line 2 shows that the country
dummies account for 52.6% of the variance in the fixed effects while line 3 shows that
addition of the vector of policies and practices raises the R2 to 63.9%. That is, the pol-
icies and practices explain 23.8% [= (0.639 – 0.526)/ (1 – 0.526)] of the variance
beyond that associated with country differences.
The remaining lines in the table explore the effects of adding school-level covariates
to these calculations, where the covariates are average levels of student attributes as
defined in the table note. Line 4 shows that these attributes by themselves account for
21.4% of the variance. Addition of policy and practices in line 5 raises the R2 to
0.583, so that policies and practices explain 46.9% [= (0.583 – 0.214)/ (1 – 0.214)] of
35 The results from these regressions are available from the authors on request.
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the variance beyond that associated with other school level factors. Finally, lines 6 and
7 shows that addition of school policies and practices to regressions with covariates and
country dummies raises the R2 from 0.579 (line 5) to 0.708, so that policies and prac-
tices explain 30.6% [= (0.708 – 0.579)/(1 – 0.579)] of the variance beyond that asso-
ciated with other school level factors and country dummies.
In sum, the calculations in Table 5 show that fixed school effects are sufficiently
related to school practices and policies to reflect more than sorting of students. Lack-
ing exogenous variation in policies and practices to separate the link from the policies
and practices to test scores from the endogeneity of policies and practices to student
attributes associated with test scores, we cannot determine the magnitudes of the pol-
icy factors on school level test scores. What the association between the fixed effects
and policies and practices does is to direct attention to school effects and decisions as
opposed to sorting of students in explaining the variance of test scores and thus in
developing school-level policies to improve scores.
Table 5. School fixed effects and residual variances for different specificationsa
Variables
Residual variance in estimated
school fixed effect(1)
R2
(2)
School fixed effectsb 5684.050
[1] Policies and practicesc 3166.016 0.443
[2] Country dummiesd 2694.240 0.526
[3] Policies and practices
with country dummiese
2051.942 0.639
[4] School-level covariatesf 4467.663 0.214
[5] School-level covariates
with policies and practicesg
2370.249 0.583
[6] School-level covariates
with country dummiesh
2392.985 0.579
[7] School-level covariates
with policies and practices
and country dummiesi
1659.743 0.708
aResults presented in the table are derived from school-level regressions (total number of schools = 17,252). The
dependent variable is school fixed effects. France excluded as the school questionnaire was not administered.
School sampling weights are used. Analysis based on clustering-robust standard errors.
bSchool fixed effects have been extracted from a student-level regression which includes student background
characteristics and school dummies.
cThe regression includes as explanatory variables school policies and practices. These are the policies and prac-
tices presented in Table 4 and described in the Appendix.
dThe regression includes as explanatory variables country dummies.
eThe regression includes as explanatory variables school policies and practices as described above, and country
dummies.
fThe regression includes as explanatory variables school-level covariates. Covariates include the following vari-
ables: school-level average student age, gender, grade, whether the language of test is main language spoken at
home, whether student lives with two parents, immigrant status, parents’ immigrant status, index of socio-
economic cultural status, school enrolment, dummies for community size where the school is located.
gThe regression includes as explanatory variables school-level covariates as described above, and school policies
and practices.
hThe regression includes as explanatory variables school-level covariates as described above and country dummies.
iThe regression includes as explanatory variables school-level covariates as described above, school policies and
practices, and country dummies.
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5. SCHOOL EFFECTS AND FAMILY BACKGROUND
As noted in the Section 2 literature review, studies invariably find that family back-
ground factors are strongly associated with student performance in schools and test
scores. Table 1 showed that background factors by themselves explained 33% of the
variance in test scores among all students and explained from 14% (Asian countries)
to 29% (EU15) of the variance in test scores within country groups. Given the large
role of the school which students attend in the variance of test scores, we ask the
extent to which, if at all, the schools which students attend mediate the relation
between family background and student test scores. The answer is a surprisingly large
extent.
The PISA contains three potential measures of family background:36 the education
of their parent,37 the number of books in the household,38 and a composite ‘index of
socio-economic and cultural status’ (ESCS)39 developed by PISA. Students report on
their parents’ education and on the number of books in their household. PISA calcu-
lates the ESCS based on the level of parental education converted into years of school-
ing,40 an index of parental occupation, an index of family wealth, cultural possessions,
home educational resources, and an index of home possessions, which includes the
variable number of books at home.
Table 6 records the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of these variables
among students in all PISA countries and in the five groupings that we have exam-
ined. The means for the different groupings show variation in the levels of the back-
ground variables while the standard deviations show variation within the country
groupings.
Students from Asian countries have a higher share of parents who have completed
higher education (39%) compared to the students in the OECD countries (31%).
Parental education is almost always positively associated with better school perfor-
mance by children.41 Asian students taking the PISA tests also report living in families
with more books than students in OECD countries: 43% of Asian students live in
36 See Schuetz et al. (2008) for a discussion of the advantages/disadvantages of these different measures.
37 Answers are based on the ISCED classification (PISA 2009, Student Questionnaire, questions n. 10,
11, 14, 15). PISA derives an index of the highest level of education of either parent. It also converts this
into the highest number of years of schooling.
38 This variable comes from students’ responses to a question about the number of books in their home
exclusive of magazines, newspapers and schoolbooks. Students can choose one of the six categories: 0–10,
11–25, 26–100, 101–200, 201–500, more than 500 (PISA 2009, Student Questionnaire, question n. 22).
39 The OECD Technical Report (OECD, 2012a,) details the construction of this index. The index is stan-
dardized to have an OECD mean of 0 and a standard deviation equal to 1.
40 The variable is derived from the student questionnaire, in which PISA asks students the highest level of
schooling completed by their father/mother and whether their father/mother has completed undergradu-
ate or postgraduate degrees.
41 Some analysts argue that parents’ education increases the marginal productivity of children’s educa-
tion, by raising expectations about educational success (Davis-Kean, 2005; Bjorklund and Salvanes, 2010)
but it can also operate through the higher income associated with higher parental education.
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families with more than 100 books compared to 34% of students in the OECD
country sample. The ESCS index gives students in the EU15+ the highest score and
students in middle income countries the lowest scores.
We have examined the mediating role of school fixed effects in the relation
between each of the measures and test scores by estimating variants of Equation
(1).42 We first estimated the effect of a given background factor with no measure
Table 6. Mean of family background measures, PISA 2009
Country groupg
Years of
schoolinga
Books at
homec
Index of Economic,
Social and Cultural
Status (ESCS)e
Meanb Mean categoryd Meanf
All 12.17 2.82 –0.54
(3.63) (1.42) (1.21)
OECD 13.11 3.16 –0.03
(3.11) (1.45) (1.01)
EU 15+h 13.45 3.32 0.02
(2.98) (1.44) (0.93)
Asian 13.56 3.45 –0.15
(2.39) (1.37) (0.82)
Other high income 13.28 3.30 –0.20
(1.77) (1.36) (0.82)
Middle income 10.77 2.26 –1.18
(4.05) (1.18) (1.22)
Note: Sampling probability weights have been used in order to provide descriptive statistics representative for each
country.
aHighest level of education of either parent according to the ISCED classification. Parental education has been
converted into years of schooling according to a country-specific scale provided in PISA 2009 (Vol. I,
Table A1.1, p. 168) [completed primary education (ISCED 1); completed secondary education (ISCED 2 (lower
secondary), ISCED Level 3B or 3C (vocational/pre-vocational upper secondary); ISCED 3A (upper secondary)
and/or ISCED 4 (non-tertiary post-secondary)); completed tertiary education, that is theoretically oriented ter-
tiary and postgraduate (ISCED 5A, 6)].
bAverage years of schooling with standard deviation in parentheses.
cBooks at home shows the share of individuals according to the number of books they report having in their
home.
dMean of the books-at-home categories (1–6). These are the six categories: 1 = 1–10 books, 2 = 11–25 books, 3 =
26–100, 4 = 101–200, 5 = 201–500, 6 = more than 500 books. Standard deviation in parentheses.
eThe ESCS index is constructed by using the following three sub-components: the higher parental occupation
index, the higher parental education index and the index of home possessions.
fMean of the ECSC index. Standard deviation in parentheses.
gOnly a low-income country participated in the PISA 2009 study: Kyrgyzstan, so we did not include this group.
The analysis has been carried out for this country and is available from the authors upon request.
hThis category includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland.
42 This production function approach is commonly used in the literature (Hanushek and Woessmann,
2011a). The main underlying assumptions are related to the fact that the production function is known
and inputs are used to maximize student learning outcomes. Hanushek (1979, 1986) describes some of its
limitations. Schuetz et al. (2008) note that country-specific results may be affected by the measurement of
background factors.
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of school effects in the equation and then estimated the equation with the inclu-
sion of fixed school effects.43 We obtained similar results for each of the three
background measures.44 For simplicity we summarize our findings for the ESCS
variable, which has the virtue of encompassing parental schooling and books at
home measures of background.
Table 7 gives results for all countries and for countries with early tracking policies
and countries without them, the better to isolate effects within school unrelated to
tracking. Results for particular country groupings are available from the authors. The
table records coefficients on the ESCS measure of background and the R2 associated
with the regression of test scores on the variables specified in the row and in the table
note. Row (1) records the estimated coefficients on family background with country
fixed effects as the only covariate so that the analysis focuses on within-country vari-
ation in test scores. Row (2) includes a set of student-level and a set of school-level con-
trols that reflect in addition differences in the urban location and size of schools across
countries (see Appendix Table A1). In both rows the coefficients of family background
are large and significant. In row (1) for the all country sample, a one-SD change in the
ESCS index is associated with a 0.36 SD change in test scores. The addition of back-
ground and school control variables reduces the estimated size of the ESCS effect to
0.28 SD. But it is in row (3), where we add the school dummy variables that the coeffi-
cients on the ESCS background measures drop greatly. For all countries, the coeffi-
cient drops from 24.20 to 10.28 – a 58% fall. The effect size falls to 0.16 SDs. While
the extent of the decline differs among the groups, the calculations in ensuing columns
show that it is large in all cases.45
PISA contains an alternative set of measures designed to cast light on the relation
between family background and test scores. Fourteen countries46 in the 2009 wave of
PISA practices administered a parent questionnaire that asked about parenting prac-
tices relevant to education.47 The OECD analysis of these questions (OECD, 2012b)
shows that parental activities are positively correlated with test scores but that specific
activities with the child have different relations to outcomes. A parent discussing what
their child is doing is positively related to test scores whereas a parent discussing their
43 Dustmann et al. (2012) used a similar approach to examine the effect of school resources, class size and
accountability on the gap in learning outcomes among migrant and native students in PISA 2006.
44 These results are available from the authors upon request.
45 Table 7 only shows the coefficients related to the family background variables. The complete regres-
sion results are available from the authors.
46 These are the countries: Hong Kong, Korea, Macao-China, Chile, Denmark, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, New Zealand, Poland and Portugal. The parent data file includes the variables derived from the par-
ent context questionnaire (OECD, 2012a, p. 328). The Parent Questionnaire of the PISA 2009 study was
delivered to parents by students who had to return it to school once it had been filled in. At page 2 of the
Parent Questionnaire it is explained that ‘This survey should be completed by a parent (or jointly by both
parents) or other <primary caregiver> of the student’.
47 PISA 2006 also included some parent questions. Before the 2006 and 2009 waves, cross-country data
sets of student performance did not provide much information on parents’ participation in home and
school-related activities.
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child’s progress in school with a teacher is negatively related to test scores, presumably
because the parent is responding to the student not doing that well in school. The
OECD also finds that parental involvement is higher in more affluent households.
Table 7. Regression coefficients of Student test scores on ESCS measure of fam-
ily background PISA 2009a
Country group
[number of observationsb, c]
Empirical
model All
Without school
trackingd
With school
trackingd
ESCS
coefficient R2
ESCS
coefficient R2
ESCS
coefficient R2
[1] Test score on ESCSe
(with country fixed
effects)
31.21*** 0.42 31.48*** 0.41 31.09*** 0.42
(0.536) (1.030) (0.609)
[2] Test score on ESCSe
with other covariatesf,
country fixed effects)
24.20*** 0.48 25.62*** 0.48 23.05*** 0.49
(0.497) (0.899) (0.572)
[3] Test score on ESCSe
with school fixed
effects and other
covariatesf
10.28*** 0.66 13.02*** 0.62 8.53*** 0.69
(0.317) (0.644) (0.309)
[4] Test score on ESCSe
with parental
involvement
indicatorsg
other covariatesf,
school fixed effects)
9.39*** 0.64 15.80*** 0.44 8.88*** 0.65
(0.51) (1.07) (0.55)
Notes: Regressions weighted by the students’ sampling probabilities.
aEstimates using parents’ education and number of books at home available from the authors upon request.
bNumber of observations in [4] for the 14 countries that administered the parental involvement questionnaire.
Regressions [1]–[3] estimated for the 14 country sample given similar results to those in the table. Results are
available from the authors. Detailed descriptive statistics related to the parental involvement variables are
available from the authors.
cThe number of observations for the different groups of countries and related estimation is the following: All:
([1]–[3]: 515,956; [4]:101,370); Without school tracking ([1]–[3]: 171,885; [4]: 21,356); With school tracking
([1]–[3]: 316,357; [4]: 80,014).
dThe ‘without school tracking’ group includes countries where age at first selection of students into differ-
ent tracks is equal to 16 or higher. The group ‘with school tracking’ includes countries where age at first
selection is below 16. Information on school tracking: sources used to derive this variable are described in
the footnote of Table 2. The country-specific information on school tracking is available from the authors.
eThe ESCS index is constructed from the following three sub-components: the higher parental occupation index,
the higher parental education index and the index of home possessions.
fCovariates: student age, gender, grade, whether the language of test is the main language spoken at home,
whether the student lives with two parents, immigrant status, parents’ immigrant status, school enrolment, dum-
mies for community size where the school is located.
gParental involvement is measured with four indices extracted from the parental questionnaire described in the
appendix: ‘parental involvement’, ‘resources’, ‘early support at ISCED1’, ‘current support’.
Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors): * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes signifi-
cance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
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However, it warns that the high non-response rate in some countries raises questions
about the results (OECD, 2012a, p. 328).48
We selected from the parent questionnaire four areas of involvement to examine:
early parental investment in children exemplified by questions about how often they
read books with the child at an early age; participation in school-related activities such
as whether parents participate in the local school governance; provision of resources to
the child such as subscription to a journal or magazine; and current activities with the
child such as discussing political or social issues with the child.49 Row (4) in Table 7
shows the addition of the parental involvement indexes had a modest effect on the es-
timated impact of the ESCS background measure overall, decreasing it among OECD
countries to an estimated effect size of 0.09 of a standard deviation, while increasing
the background coefficient among Asian countries.50 It does not have the consistent
effect on the estimated background effect that the schooling fixed effects have.51
48 Some bias may also be generated by the design of the survey: better educated parents may be more
likely to fill this optional questionnaire and more diligent students – with higher test scores – may be more
likely to bring the questionnaire home, remember to ask their parents to fill it and after to return it to
school (OECD, 2012b, p. 91). In this regard, descriptive statistics presented in the OECD study (2012b, p.
163) carried out for the entire PISA 2009 sample and for the sample of students who answered the parent
questionnaire show a significant heterogeneity in terms of response rate across countries. Apart from
Poland where the questions on parental involvement were not asked (OECD, 2012b, p. 50), the response
rate varies from about 100% in Macao-China to about 60% in Denmark. There are also some differences
in terms of demographic characteristics. Students in the sample with answers to the parent questionnaire
have on average better reading performance, a higher socio-economic status, are more likely to be a girl
and less likely to be of immigrant status. Moreover, a difference between the information on parents’ edu-
cation as reported by students and parents themselves should be acknowledged, being information self-
reported by parents on average than the one reported by their children (Jerrim and Micklewright, 2012).
49 We use indexes based on the parents’ answers to the questions in each area available in the PISA data-
base: Early Parental Involvement Index of activities with the child (when the child attended the first year of
ISCED 1); Current Parental Involvement Index of current activities with the child; Parent Participation in School
Related Activities Index of participation in school-related activities; Resources Directly Available to the Child Index of
resources available to the child. Section A2 in the appendix provides a detailed description of the indexes,
items in the questionnaires on which they are based and how they have been constructed. The PISA 2009
Technical Report explains the computation, scaling methods and weights involved in the construction of
the indexes (OECD, 2010d, 2012a). The PISA variables represent a limited selection of the many aspects
and activities that shape the relationship between parents and children and could impact on the students’
learning progress. Descriptive statistics related to the parental involvement variables are available from
the authors upon request.
50 Rows 1–3 include all countries in the specified group. Row 4 includes only the 14 countries where the
parental questionnaire was administered. Regressions in rows 1–3 have also been estimated with the same
sample as in row 4. Results show that parental involvement has only a limited impact in reducing the
ESCS coefficient for all country groups. These additional results together with the results for specific
groups of countries are available from the authors upon request.
51 Our findings suggest that measures of parental practices do not account for much of the parental back-
ground factors. Instead the major factor that reduces the impact of background factors on outcomes are
school fixed effects. It is important to notice that given the structure of the PISA database we are able to
control for a limited number of family background characteristics and parental practices and we are not
able to control for the unobserved parental characteristics. Therefore, given the existing asymmetry of our
analysis we are not able to draw conclusions on the role that unobserved parental characteristics
correlated with school fixed effects may play in affecting outcomes.
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Measured school policies and practices have a greater effect in mediating the influence
of background on test scores than measured parental involvement activities.
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our analysis of the 2009 wave of the PISA data set has found that much of the vari-
ation of test scores is associated with the school students attend and that school fixed
effects are a major pathway for the link between measures of family background and
test scores.
Within the limits of observational data, we estimated the extent to which the vari-
ation in student performance across schools reflects mechanisms that sort students into
different types of schools as opposed to the relation between school policies/practices
and student performance. We examined national policies toward tracking students at
different ages, school policies toward selective admissions and toward admissions
based on residency and between private and public schools and found that while
greater sorting by country or school raised the variance of test scores among schools
and lowered variance of test scores within schools, measurable sorting leaves a sizeable
proportion of school fixed effects for school educational policies and practices to affect
student performance and thus for policies and practices to improve student test scores.
Using the reports of principals and students on the PISA, we examined the associ-
ation between explicit policies/practices and the test scores of students attending
different schools.
Consistent with our analysis of sorting, the full set of measured policies and prac-
tices accounted for a sufficient proportion of the school fixed effects to support the
view that policies and practices can affect test scores in important ways. We found that
several policies, particularly those relating to school resources, were significantly asso-
ciated with test scores, though some had differing effects on schools with different
tracking policies, highlighting the potential for the same policy to have different effects
in different settings. Since principals undoubtedly differ in how they implement pol-
icies across countries and within countries, we believe that new PISA questions on
implementation would increase the proportion of the test score variance associated
with policies and practices.
Our analysis of the role of sorting as opposed to within-school policies and practices
has implications on the continual debate regarding these alternative ways of improv-
ing educational outcomes. As we saw in the literature review, much research using
cross-country data focuses on the effects of explicit national tracking on outcomes
while recognizing that other mechanism also sort students with particular abilities into
schools with students like themselves. Our data shows that, taking sorting as given,
there is still a large space for school level policies and practices within sorting regimes.
Schools in countries which track students early and schools that admit students with
greater selectivity show substantial school effects independent of the sorting and
measured student attributes. Within sorting groups, moreover, schools operate with
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different policies and practices, some of which are associated with different test score
outcomes that suggests substantial potential for improvements in scores within sorting
groups.
Our Table 4 analysis found that while the approaches to learning practices are
associated with students’ test scores in a similar way between groups of countries
with tracking and those without tracking, as defined in the tracking literature,
other policies such as those relating to school autonomy and accountability are
associated with test scores differently in tracking than in non-tracking environ-
ments. To the extent that these effects reflect the differential impact of policies on
students, they direct policy attention at the value of developing different school
policies depending on the extent of national tracking. Reducing school autonomy
in countries without sorting is associated with poorer performance while it has
modest negligible effects in countries with sorting. The key policy implication is
that the choice of some within school policies and practices should be considered
differently depending on sorting and that international evidence that something
works in a system with tracking cannot be taken as indicative that it will work in
a system without tracking.
The biggest problem in analysing the PISA evidence is unpacking the causality of
the observed associations: the extent to which they reflect the effect of policies on test
scores or of student performance and attributes on policies. We suggest that the best
way to untangle this is to address it directly on the principals’ questionnaire: to add a
set of questions asking when and why a policy was adopted and whether the school
had assessed it through some sort of before/after or other analysis. If school policies
matter and effectiveness depends on implementation, the best way for international
tests to move from measuring outcomes to helping devise reforms in schooling would
be to measure these factors at the school level.
The strongest and most consistent relation between policies and practices in the
PISA data was not however, based on principal reports but on student reports on
teaching practices at their school. The strength and consistency of the relation
between student reports and school test performances suggest that the most promising
way for PISA and other international surveys to increase our understanding of school
effects would be through obtaining more information about school experiences from
students themselves. A set of questions to students on school practices and individual
experiences would offer a new line of sight into what goes on in schools that actually
affects student performance.
Following this line of thought, the PISA (or other surveys) could illuminate sorting
mechanisms by asking students or parents about why the student was attending the
current school and how they were admitted. Bratti and Checchi’s (2013) finding in an
analysis of a Italian re-test of schools in the 2009 PISA that cross-sectional test scores
were good measures of changes in student performance when student attrition was
low but bad measures when student attrition was high suggests the value of questions
on how long students were in a given school.
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While it can only be suggestive for directions of policy reforms, our analysis of
the school fixed effects in the PISA data suggests that policies related to the qual-
ity of educational resources and practices at the classroom level are good candid-
ates for improvements in performance. We suspect that the reason they turned
out to be strongly linked to school test performances is that they are closer to
actual classroom activities than some of the accountability and autonomy manage-
rial practice questions and to the parental activity questions on which the PISA
focused. Still, even finding avenues for improvement does not itself justify schools
seeking those reforms. It is necessary as well to estimate the cost of the reforms
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011b) and the length of time it takes for reforms to
become effective (Braga et al., 2013).
Still, given the great success of PISA in discussion of educational outcomes around
the world and its influence on policies, we believe that improving it in ways that will
better illuminate school effects and help identify the causal forces behind those effects
has the potential for catalysing school level reforms that could improve the perform-
ance of poorer performing schools and reduce the magnitude of the schools fixed
effect that we found in the 2009 PISA.
Discussion
Daniele Checchi
University of Milan
The paper by Freeman and Viarengo raises important questions that any educa-
tional authority would like to know the answer to, in order to manage important
school decisions, like student allocation and/or teacher allocation to schools, in
order to maximize school effectiveness at national level. However, my impression
is that they aim to obtain more information from PISA than these data can pro-
vide. Given their extended presentation, I will only recall here that PISA consists
of a representative cross-section of 15-year-old students in formal educational insti-
tutions.52
Let us start with their first results. In all countries and groups of countries, they find
that a substantial proportion of the variation of test scores within countries is associ-
ated with attending a specific school. This is a well-known fact in the sociological liter-
ature, which speaks of school stratification. From an economic point of view, it
implies that schools can be heterogeneous, due to either
52 This may be problematic in countries where students can be retained, since repeated failure may retain
students in lower secondary schools. In addition, early school leavers are also excluded from the test, thus
artificially raising the scores in countries with the highest drop out rates.
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• teaching practices (if students were randomly allocated to schools, every difference
would be teaching practices), or
• sorting (if schools were to use the same teaching practices, every difference among
them would be attributable to sorting, either of students and/or of teachers).
In principle, these two alternative situations could be identified iff one had an exogen-
ous source of variations for one or the other. The authors intend to use the tracking
age as such an instrument, but it is just one source of practice. They add selection in
admission as a second one. But the list is longer (think of private/public).
From a conceptual point of view this distinction is hard to conceive, because sorting
may occur because of different teaching practices.
Think of a situation with heterogeneous students of mass one; their ability is uni-
formly distributed in ½a;a. There are just two schools, A and B. The former is talent
oriented, the latter specializes in weaker students. Performance in school is given by
yij = aj + bjai, with aA > aB and bA < bB, where yij is the educational outcome of stu-
dent i when attending school j. If teaching practices are common knowledge, the stu-
dents will sort according to their level of ability: students with a[ aBaAbAbB will attend
school A, while the others will go in school B.
The average performance of school A will be
yA ¼ aA þ bA
aþ a_
2
; a
_ ¼ aB  aA
bA  bB
whereas the average performance of school B is
yB ¼ aB þ bB
aþ a^
2
We could in principle separate the role of teaching practices if we could observe
the ability of students. We actually do not necessarily need ability, we would like
to observe the underlying expectations that drive students’ sorting. But in my
opinion nothing of the sort is available in PISA, since the rich array of variables
describing parental background does not necessarily capture all individual hetero-
geneity.
The authors believe it is possible to identify the relative contribution of students
sorting by using variations in the tracking policies of different countries. I have two
objections to this strategy:
• tracking is not exogenous, but reflects the prevailing opinions of the local constitu-
ency with respect to school differentiation and/or desired educational achieve-
ments in the population. When some German l€anders retained that early tracking
was detrimental to student achievements, they simply introduced comprehensive
schools (gesamtschule).
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• tracking is not only described by age tracking; one may also want to consider the
number of tracks available, the share of students who are actually tracked, the
degree of differentiation of educational contents, the level of qualification of teach-
ers in different tracks, the absence/existence of the dual tertiary system, and so on.
Even if tracking is a general institutional feature, the selection of alternative vari-
ables makes a difference (at least from an econometric point of view).
However, the authors are ingenious in exploring new measures of the degree of school
stratification, by estimating the relationship between school fixed effects and (within-
country) school rank. Conditional on an equivalent number of schools in each coun-
try, this relationship (Equation 2 in the paper) offers an indication of how strong is the
sorting effect, which comes out correlated with the extent of tracking (measured by
age of student first allocation to tracks). These correlations do not tell us the direction
of causality. Moreover, they do not exhaust the potential sources of student sorting.
Consider, for example, family income as another source of student sorting when pri-
vate schools are available. Think of religion and/or ethnicity, when cleavages are
endemic in some society. If one would repeat the regression presented in Table 2 with
one or more variables in this list, he would probably get similar results. The authors
go in this direction with the results of Table 3, where surprisingly they find no signi-
ficance in the correlation between school fixed effect and the extent of the private sec-
tor in education provision within the country.53
The third contribution of the paper is the investigation of teaching practices. This is
an endless effort, because information collected from students is abundant but con-
fused. If we look at Column 1 of Table 4 we find some results that are at odds with
common wisdom. Most of the variables on school autonomy and accountability are
insignificant (or wrongly signed, as in the case of principal evaluation – compare this
finding with Woessmann et al., 2009). Similar results are obtained for school
resources, while emphasis is placed on student learning strategies. But this factor is
extracted from answers to elementary questions (like ‘when I study, I try to memorize
everything that is covered in the text’), on which students have to express their relative
agreement or disagreement. In Table 4 the authors find a negative correlation
between school fixed effect and memorization and elaboration, but positive with control of
learning strategies. What is surprising is that when we consider the raw data at student
level, all these variables are positively correlated.54 My impression is that students are
rather confused when describing their learning strategies, and one should explore the
53 This may due to multicollinearity between being private and selecting students for admissions. In
Bertola and Checchi (2013) we have shown that student sorting may go in either direction (best students
sorted into the private, or best students sorted into the public sector), depending on teaching techniques.
This may account for the non-significance of the coefficient on private found by the authors.
54 Given 506,640 observations, the correlation between memorization and elaboration is 0.40, between
memorization and control of learning strategies is 0.52, while the correlation between elaboration and control of
learning strategies is 0.55.
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degree of disagreement within the classes before making inference for educational out-
comes at school level.
Marco Manacorda
Queen Mary University of London
This paper is deemed to have a large echo among policymakers and researchers in
education alike. Based largely on observational data, the authors makes a quite bold –
and ultimately I believe convincing – statement about the major role of school policies
and practices in affecting children’s school outcomes.
Ultimately, the paper provides some reason for optimism as it suggests that
there is room for policymakers to improve learning by fostering the adoption of
good practices and policies by schools, something that seems easier to achieve, at
least in the short run, than affecting parental behaviour, leaving aside parental
characteristics.
What makes the paper extraordinary – and the empirical exercise equally daunting
– is the sheer amount of data covering 74 countries and providing very detailed in-
formation on school policies and practices as well as information (but only for a sam-
ple of countries) on parental involvement at home and in school.
I thought that the best way to discuss the paper was by trying to ‘unpack it’ with a
policy audience in mind. Indeed the paper is so rich that it is at times slightly hard to
digest even for a consumed data practitioner like myself.
The difficulty that anybody wanting to address the question of the role of school
versus parental inputs in affecting school outcomes is that children are not randomly
allocated across schools. Showing that children in ‘better schools’ do better in terms of
test scores raises the suspicion that this is not due to what schools do but to the fact
that children who would have done better anyways (from more affluent backgrounds,
with more motivated parents, etc.) also attend schools that are better managed, with
more and better quality inputs, better teachers etc. In other terms students sort across
schools.
The basic idea of the paper to get round this problem, with a clever twist that I dis-
cuss below, is quite simple. Via means of regression analysis, the authors decompose
the variation in test scores into a component that is due to observable parental inputs
and another component that is due to observable plus unobservable school inputs.
The latter are subsumed by school fixed effects. One can try to assess the role of
observable school practices and policies in explaining differences in test scores across
schools by examining how school fixed effects vary with such policies and practices.
One has to be cautious here: as long as there is sorting along unobservable parental
and child characteristics, school fixed effects or observable practices will soak up some
of the effect of such unobservables, and one will most likely end up attributing too
much weight to school inputs.
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That sorting indeed matters is clear from the results in Tables 2 and 3. The
logic of these tables is stringent: if sorting partly happens through early tracking,
and tracking simply reshuffles children across schools with no direct effect on
learning, then the dispersion in average scores among schools will be larger in
countries that track children earlier. By the opposite token, the dispersion in test
scores within schools will be smaller. This is precisely what is shown in Tables 2
and 3. This suggests that sorting matters although tracking (as well as other
selective policies) does not seem to explain much of the variation in test scores
across schools. This is reassuring, although the concern remains that the measures
of sorting available do not explain much of the actual sorting that in practice
occurs (through residential segregation for example).
Table 4 is to me the most interesting table in the paper. Column 1 shows that
school policies and practices matter in explaining differences in test scores across
schools. As said, sorting remains potentially an issue as school policies and prac-
tices might be correlated with unobserved individual or parental characteristics.
Where the table is really convincing, and the approach very smart while remain-
ing simple, is when it contrasts column 1 and column 2. The latter examines how
the dispersion in individual test scores within schools (as opposed to the dispersion
in average test scores across schools in column 1) is affected by such policies and
practices. The authors’ argument is that if one finds that some policies affect both
average test scores and the dispersion of test scores, as in the case of tracking dis-
cussed above, then the founded suspicion is that the effect of these policies and
practices works through sorting. However, if policies and practices affect the dis-
persion in average scores across schools but not the within school dispersion in
test scores, then this brings ammunition to the argument that these practices are
truly affective in improving outcomes. Indeed, it appears that, in most cases, these
observable policies and practices affect average outcomes (column 1) with little or
no effect on within schools dispersion (column 2).
With this conclusion in mind, Table 5 finally attempts to put a number of how
much measurable school policies and practices matter in explaining the variation in
test scores across schools. The authors estimate this number at between 23% and
30%. This is perhaps slightly overoptimistic, given that sorting remains still an issue,
although based on the evidence in Table 4, the bias is presumably small.
In sum, the authors have proved creative in trying to come to credible conclusions
based on purely observational data. The paper makes a rather compelling case for
some – but not all – school policies and practices to be a major contributor to differ-
ences in achievement across children.
One additional consideration that comes from reading this paper is that greater
effort should be exerted to collect additional information in the PISA data. Although
important steps have been taken in this direction, it appears that additional informa-
tion about parental involvement (for all countries) and characteristics, children’s effort
and detailed residential location would prove extremely valuable to advance our
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understanding of the determinants of children’s school outcomes across and within
countries.
Panel discussion
Fabrice Murtin found the central result of the paper regarding school effects to be
credible. However, he contended that a major factor influencing the quality of a
school is the type of principal leading it (e.g. level of experience, powers/authority).
Murtin explained that this is a particularly relevant driver in disadvantaged areas in
OECD countries and suggested further exploring this venue. Second, he noted that
school autonomy is not expected to have an impact on its own. Murtin advised the
authors to interact autonomy with school accountability in order to potentially extract
a statistically significant effect. Ester Faia stated that the identification problem is
prevalent in a number of literatures. She mentioned that Becker stipulates the condi-
tions for identifying a theoretical model (unless one assumes the presence of some
form of frictions).
In her reply Martina Viarengo reported that the interaction between school
autonomy and accountability is insignificant in their analysis. She noted that
although they have a rich dataset, limits still exist in terms of available controls.
Viarengo acknowledged the argument that differences in the way that tracking is
implemented may exist across countries. On the private–public divide, she told
the panel that this matter is addressed in robustness checks not currently
reported in the paper.
APPENDIX
Variables
The list below describes the variables used in this study that have been extracted from
the PISA database (http://pisa2009.acer.edu.au). A thorough description is provided
in the School, Student Questionnaires, the related Codebooks and PISA 2009 Tech-
nical Report (OECD, 2010d, 2012a). The variable related to tracking has been
extracted from various sources and is available from the authors.
Tracking
• School Tracking Policy is a dummy variable =1 if age at first selection is below 16.
• Tracking Index is based on the actual age at first selection. The index varies between
10 and 18. Ages have been reverse coded.
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Other sorting mechanisms
• Private School is a dummy variable = 1 if the school is private.
• Private Funding is the share of funding provided by private sources.
• Selective Admissions is a dummy variable = 1 if student’s record of academic perform-
ance (including placement tests) is always considered when students are admitted
to the school.
• Selective Residence is a dummy variable = 1 if residence in a particular area is always
considered when students are admitted to the school.
Policies
School autonomy
• The Index of the Relative Level of Responsibility of School Staff Relating to Curriculum and
Assessment was computed from four items measuring the school principal’s report
concerning who had responsibility for curriculum and assessment. The index was
standardized to having an OECD mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
• The Index of the Relative Level of Responsibility of School Staff in Allocating Resources was
derived from six items measuring the school principals’ report on who has consid-
erable responsibility for tasks regarding school management of resource allocation.
The index was standardized to having an OECD mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one.
Resources
• The Index on the School’s Educational Resources was computed on the basis of seven
items measuring the school principal’s perceptions of potential factors hindering
instruction at school. All items were inverted for IRT scaling and positive WLE
scores indicate better quality of educational resources.
• The Index of Extra-Curricular Activities Offered by School is based on school principals’
reports of what extra-curricular activities occur at their school. Responses to the
items were coded such that positive WLE scores indicate higher levels of extra-cur-
ricular school activities.
• The Student-Teacher Ratio is enrolment by the total number of teachers.
Teacher characteristics
• The Proportion of Fully Certified Teachers was computed by dividing the number of
fully certified teachers by the total number of teachers.
• The Proportion of Teachers with a University Education is the number of teachers with
ISCED 5A qualification divided by the total number of teachers.
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Selectivity
• The Index of Ability Grouping between Classes was derived from the two items by
assigning schools to three categories: (1) schools with no ability grouping for any
subjects, (2) schools with one of these forms of ability grouping between classes for
some subjects and (3) schools with one of these forms of ability grouping for all
subjects.
• The Index of Academic School Selectivity was computed by assigning schools to three
different categories: (1) schools where neither of these two factors is considered for
student admittance, (2) schools considering at least one of these two factors, (3)
schools where at least one of these two factors is a prerequisite for student admit-
tance.
Accountability
• Achievement data are posted publicly is a dummy variable =1 if school principals said
achievement data was posted publicly during the past year.
• Achievement data are used in evaluation of the principal’s performance is a dummy variable =
1 if school principals said achievement data was used to monitor the principal’s
performance during the past year.
• Achievement data are used in evaluation of teachers’ performance is a dummy variable = 1 if
school principals said achievement data was used to monitor teachers’ perform-
ance during the past year.
• Teacher peer-review is a dummy variable = 1 if school principals said teacher peer
review was used to monitor teachers during the past year.
• External observers is a dummy variable = 1 if school principals said external observ-
ers were used to monitor teachers during the past year.
Practices
Approaches to learning
• Index of Memorization. Positive WLE scores on these indices indicate higher import-
ance attached to the given reading strategy. Four items measuring the construct of
memorization were included in the PISA 2009 main study.
• Index of Elaboration. Positive WLE scores on these indices indicate higher import-
ance attached to the given reading strategy. Four items measuring the construct of
elaboration were included in the PISA 2009 main study.
• Index of Control Learning Strategies. Positive WLE scores on these indices indicate
higher importance attached to the given reading strategy. Five items measuring
the construct of control learning strategies were included in the PISA 2009 main
study.
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Staff attitude
• Teachers’ Low Expectations as detrimental to the learning of students is a dummy
variable = 1 if school principals said it was to some extent or a lot.
• Staff Resisting Change as detrimental to the learning of students is a dummy variable
= 1 if school principals said to some extent or a lot.
Family background
• Years of Schooling is the highest level of education of either parent according to the
ISCED classification.
• Books at Home provides the share of individuals according to the number of books
they report having in their home.
• The Index of Economic, Social and Cultural Status is constructed by using three sub-
components: the higher parental occupation index, the higher parental education
index and the index of home possessions.
Parental involvement
• The Index of the Early Activities with the Child when the Child attended the First Year of
ISCED 1 is related to parental support of child’s reading literacy and based on the
information provided by parents. Positive WLE scores indicate greater parental
support of child’s reading literacy at the beginning of ISCED 1.
• The Index of the Current Activities with the Child is related to parental support in home
activities and is based on the information provided by parents. Positive WLE
scores indicate greater parental support of child’s reading literacy.
• The Index of Parental Involvement is related to parents’ participation in school-related
activities and is based on the information provided by parents. Positive WLE
scores indicate greater parental involvement in their child’s school.
• The Index of Resources Available to the Child is related to resources available to the
child at home and is based on the information provided by parents. Positive WLE
scores indicate greater availability of reading resources at home.
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